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NO KNOCK SEARCH 
WARRANTS IN GEORGIA 
 
Published in The Georgia Defender, p. 1 (July 1996).  There is a caselaw update at the end of the 
article. 
 
Author: Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. 
No knock search warrants are issued frequently in Georgia nowadays, and such 
warrants have "simply become customary in ... drug cases." Adams v. State, 201 Ga. 
App. 12, 410 S. E. 2d 139, 141 (1991). But is the legality of such warrants firmly 
established in Georgia? In my opinion, the legal authority for these warrants is shaky, 
and I believe the Georgia Supreme Court, which has never passed on the validity of 
the warrants, can be persuaded to hold that no knock warrants are illegal. 
Alternatively, I think the Georgia Court of Appeals can be persuaded to overrule its 
inadequately reasoned, unpersuasive precedents upholding no knock warrants.  
Georgia has no statute specifically authorizing a magistrate to issue no-knock search 
warrants. Yet the prevailing view in the United States is that no knock warrants may 
not be issued absent specific statutory authorization. 2 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 621 (3d ed. 1996). Accord: State v. 
Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 1994) (holding that no knock search warrants 
are invalid in Florida because they have not been authorized by statute; "[n]o]-knock 
warrants are disfavored under the law and limited largely to those states that have 
enacted statutory provisions authorizing their issuance"). Nor have the courts of 
Georgia advanced compelling reasons for permitting, despite the absence of statutory 
authority, no knock warrants; the caselaw which allows such warrants solely on the 
basis of judge-made law is unpersuasive and vulnerable to overruling.  
Since 1972 there have been 30 reported Georgia appellate decisions--all in the 
Georgia Court of Appeals--involving the actual issuance of a no knock search warrant 
by a magistrate, and in not one of these cases did the Court hold that inclusion of a no 
knock provision in the warrant required suppression of evidence. (These 30 decisions-
-one in the 1970's, 10 in the 1980's, and 19 thus far in the 1990's--are listed in 
chronological order in the Appendix.)  
In only three of these decisions, however, did the Court of Appeals actually examine 
the issue of the validity of no knock search warrants. In Jones v. State, 127 Ga. App. 
137, 193 S. E. 2d 38 (1972), the first Georgia appellate case involving a no knock 
warrant, the Court held a no knock provision in a search warrant was valid because 
the affidavit for the warrant stated that (1) according to informers the subject whose 
residence was to be searched had threatened to shoot the next police who entered his 
residence, and (2) the affiant felt that giving the subject notice would permit him to 
flush the evidence. The Court's opinion contains no analysis or discussion, and the 
cases cited in support of its holding that judges may, without statutory authorization, 
issue no knock warrants are inapposite. It was nine years before the Court decided 
another case involving a no knock warrant. In Cox v. State, 160 Ga. App. 199, 286 S. 
E. 2d 482 (1981), the no knock clause had been inserted into a warrant for gambling 
paraphernalia based on a GBI agent's generalized, conclusory allegations about 
gambling operations. Again citing an inapposite case, and without mentioning Jones, 
the Court held that the clause was reasonable, permissible, and legal. Finally, in Hout 
v. State, 190 Ga. App. 700, 380 S. E. 2d 330 (1989), the Court held that, where giving 
notice of authority and presence would increase the peril of the officers executing the 
warrant, a no knock provision in the warrant is authorized. The only authority cited by 
the Court was an inapposite Georgia Supreme Court case.  
More recently, in State v. Smith, 219 Ga. App. 905, 467 S. E. 2d 221, 222 (1996), the 
Court, citing Jones, stated: "A search warrant with a no-knock provision may be 
issued where the facts set out in the affidavit demonstrate exigent circumstances." 
This statement was dicta, however, because the search warrant at issue did not have a 
no-knock clause.  
In none of these four cases did the Court even acknowledge the general rule that 
judges lack the power to issue no knock warrants except where statutorily authorized; 
nor did the Court give any good reasons why Georgia judges should, simply by 
judicial fiat, assume the power to issue such warrants. In none of the cases did the 
Court properly analyze the public policy considerations at issue; in particular, there 
was a total failure to recognize the ``staggering potential [of no knock warrants] for 
violence to both occupants and police,'' State v. Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 
1994). Georgia caselaw on no knock warrants is therefore weak at best.  
Furthermore, since 1972, when the use of no knock warrants was first upheld in 
Georgia, there has been an important advance in Fourth Amendment doctrine 
concerning forcible entries to execute search warrants. When Jones, Cox, and Hout 
were handed down in 1972, 1981, and 1989 respectively, OCGA Â§17-5-27, which 
requires that generally officers executing a search warrant must give or attempt to 
give verbal notice of their purpose and authority to the occupants of a building before 
making a forcible entry, was deemed to "represent ... the common law rule," Barclay 
v. State, 142 Ga. App. 657, 236 S. E. 2d 901 (1977), but not necessarily to involve a 
Fourth Amendment requirement. However, in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927 
(1995), a unanimous U. S. Supreme Court held that the common law knock and 
announce principle forms part of the reasonableness inquiry required by the Fourth 
Amendment. Although the Supreme Court did not hold that all no knock entries are 
forbidden, the Court's decision obviously casts new light on the issue whether Georgia 
courts should permit the issuance of no knock warrants when the General Assembly 
has declined to do so.  
Recently, the Georgia Supreme Court has displayed an admirable respect for Fourth 
Amendment values, on several occasions reversing Court of Appeals decisions 
validating a search and seizure. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 262 Ga. 578, 422 S. E. 2d 
546 (1992) (reversing Court of Appeals decision that search based on third-party 
consent was valid); Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573, 422 S. E. 2d 426 (1992) (overruling 
numerous Court of Appeals decisions finding a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule in Georgia). In view of (1) the unconvincing caselaw permitting no 
knock warrants, (2) the public policy arguments not yet addressed by the Georgia 
courts, and (3) the recent extension of the Fourth Amendment to entries to execute 
search warrants, it is submitted that the Georgia Supreme Court should and can be 
persuaded to overrule Georgia Court of Appeals caselaw allowing, in the absence of 
legislative authorization, state magistrates to issue no knock warrants.  
Moreover, even if the Supreme Court declines to decide the issue of the legality of no 
knock warrants, it might be possible, for the reasons stated above, to persuade the 
Georgia Court of Appeals, en banc, to overrule its own precedents and to leave to the 
legislature, where it properly belongs, the decision as to whether state judges should 
have the power to issue warrants allowing police to crash into people's homes without 
first giving notice to the occupants. Recently, for example, the en banc Court of 
Appeals overruled its own precedents permitting conditional guilty pleas. Hooten v. 
State, 212 Ga. App. 770, 442 S. E. 2d 836 (1994).  
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CASELAW UPDATE 
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1.  Poole v. State, 266 Ga. App. 113, 596 S. E. 2d 420 (2004) (armed with a search 
warrant, about a dozen law enforcement officers from the Clayton County and Fayette 
County Drug Enforcement Task Force teams went to Pooleâ€™s apartment; the 
leading officer yelled, â€œSheriff's office, search warrant,â€  and breached the door; 
once inside, officers seized less than one gram of cocaine, fifteen and a half grams of 
marijuana, $200 in cash, scales, a handgun, and ammunition; Poole and another 
person were inside the apartment and were arrested; Poole was charged with 
possessing cocaine, possessing marijuana, and possessing marijuana with the intent to 
distribute; where a search warrant is illegally executed, the subsequent course of 
events is tainted; OCGA Â§ 17-5-27 requires a law enforcement officer entering an 
occupied residence for the purpose of executing a search warrant to give or attempt to 
give verbal notice of his authority and purpose and permits a forceful entry if the 
person inside either refuses to admit him or refuses to acknowledge and answer the 
verbal notice; the notice requirement of that Code section may be dispensed with, 
however, by a no-knock provision in the warrant or by the presence of exigent 
circumstances; exigent circumstances exist where the police have reasonable grounds 
to believe that forewarning would either greatly increase their peril or lead to the 
immediate destruction of the evidence; a search warrant with a no-knock provision 
may be issued where the facts set out in the affidavit demonstrate exigent 
circumstances; the warrant in this case did not contain a no-knock provision, and 
Poole maintains that no exigent circumstances excused the officersâ€™ forceful 
entry; it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the 
facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-
and-announce requirement; the U. S. Supreme Court has rejected a blanket exception 
to a knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations because it 
overgeneralized the risks of danger in drug investigations and because it might be 
applied to support blanket exceptions; in order to justify a no-knock entry, the police 
must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under 
the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the 
effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of 
evidence; in this case, the only information received by the officers in immediate 
proximity to the time the warrant was being executed was that, before they could 
make an announcement, a person inside the residence had looked out of and then left a 
window; but there is no evidence that Robinson, who had placed Poole under 
surveillance, believed that the person who peered through the window was Poole and 
not some person unconnected with the suspected drug activity; there is no evidence 
that Poole or the individual who peered through the window had a history of violence 
or that either had threatened violence if law enforcement officers entered; there is no 
evidence that Poole had packaged or located the drugs in the apartment for quick 
disposal; the only reference in the record to harm to the officers or destruction of the 
evidence is Robinson's testimony regarding a â€œpossibilityâ€  of such based only 
on the fact that someone looked out a window and then left the window; while the 
reasonableness standard for a forceful entry is not high, that testimony is simply 
inadequate to establish reasonable grounds to believe that, in this case, forewarning 
would have either greatly increased the officers' peril or led to the immediate 
destruction of the evidence; moreover, had Robinson, an experienced and trained drug 
investigator, believed that circumstances of this case made it essential for the officers 
to reach the threshold of Pooleâ€™s residence undetected, he could have set forth in 
his affidavit any facts that he believed demonstrated the need for an element of 
surprise as a necessary precaution in executing the search warrant and sought approval 
from the neutral magistrate for a no-knock provision; Robinson did not do so; to find 
exigent circumstances in this case would amount to the adoption of a per se rule that 
once law enforcement officers realize that an occupant of the premises to be searched 
for drugs has discovered the officersâ€™ presence outside the premises, the notice 
requirement is excused; because no exigent circumstances excused the officersâ€™ 
failure to comply with OCGA Â§ 17-5-27, the trial court erred in denying Pooleâ€™s 
motion to suppress) 
 
